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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an empirical study of economic adjustments to changes 
in property t ax l evels. These adjustments may take the form of tax capi-
talization, forward and backward shifting , tax trans formation , or any com-
bination o f some or all of them in varying degrees . Ultimately, the inter-
est is in measuring the adjus tment to taxes and t aking these into account 
in making tax policy to achi eve economic policy goals . Adjus t ments to a 
tax determine the r evenue collected and the extent to which economic policy 
goals will be affected. Under standing t he adjustments permits mor e appro-
priate action to raise r evenue and achieve economic policy goals. 
Goals of Tax Policy 
Revenue 
A t ax is obviously a source of public r evenue t o provide public ser -
vices. Thus , r evenue is the most fundamental goal of tax policy. Revenue 
will not be obtained from a property tax if taxpayers can avoid paying by 
evasion or can adjus t their asset holdings so t hat property tax is no t 
app licable . If property tax liabi lit y is dependent upon the condition of 
the i mprovements on the property, the owner can r educe his taxes by permit-
ting t he property to deteriorate. If the tax is lower under local resident 
ownership or non- profit ownership, the form of ownership c an be adjusted . 
Economic growth 
When a political body imposes a t ax, it hopes that by taxing and pro-
viding public s ervices i t will not adversely affect the tota l al location of 
r esources and cause a smaller or less useful bundle of goods and services 
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to be produced . It hopes to finance the public expenditure and r educe 
private production as little as possible . A tax policy seeks to enhance the 
value of total product and lay the groundwork for expansion o f the produc-
tive capacity o f the entire economy . If a tax cause s sufficiently less 
private investment to be undertaken or causes enough private resources to 
be withdrawn f rom production, then i t c an adverse l y affect economic growth . 
I f , on the other hand, t ax collection could cause people to work har der , 
and produce more because of the tax , the economy would move c los e r to a 
point on i ts p r oduction possibility cur ve . Thus, the t ax would surel y en -
courage growth . Other things being equal , tax policy seeks the tax which 
encourages growth the mos t or at least h inders growth in t he private sector 
the least. 
Equity 
Tax policy s eeks to impose a tax consistent with the societ y ' s concept 
of soci al j us tice. Equi ty can be defined as the equal treatment of equals 
and the suffici ently unequal treatment of unequals . Of course, to be opera-
tional one must defi ne equal and unequal and sufficient l y. These a r e not 
mathematical definitions but very per sonal opinions . One must look at the 
character istics in which people ar e equal and the characteris t ics in which 
they a r e not equa l and decide which characteris t i cs should dominate policy 
making . 
We can i llustrate the problem by comparing two exampl es i n which the 
above definition o f equity operates. Suppose that two families a r e equal 
in that the children of each need an education. Equal treatment o f equals 
requires that both families r eceive an education. The same two families 
are also unequal wi t h r espect to income. One has an annual income of 
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$15 , 000; the other has an income of $3,000 . Sufficiently unequal treatment 
of unequals requires that they be taxed differently. This example can be 
generalized into the principle of providing services publicly according to 
socially defined need and paying for the cost of them by the ability to pay. 
Another definition of equity says each person who receives the same 
service should pay the same cost . This leads to the principle of associa-
tion of benefits received with payment of taxes . Two famil i es a re unequal 
in that one uses the facilities at a public park extensively and the other 
uses them not at all . Equal treatment of equals might suggest that each 
hours use of the park should pay the same. Thus , the family using more of 
the public facility should ~e taxed mor e heavily f or the park facility 
irrespective of income or ability to pay. 
It is difficult to describe objective and precise standards of tax 
equity whic h will operate without ambiguity or the need for further inter-
pretation . Our society seems to feel that both the ability to pay and the 
association of benefits received with payment are at different times appro-
priate criteria of tax equity . Since there is mo r e than one criterion for 
equity and equity is only one goal of tax policy , it is often easier to 
decide which tax is best by voting. To vote wisely, however , it is nec es-
sary to know how alternatives affect different people and different goals . 
Given the information voters can weigh available options which affect their 
goals and choose the one with the most net benefits or least net costs. 
In order for this process to operate, however, the community needs to 
know just what the burden of alternative taxes is and upon whom it falls. 
Because of price , wage, investment, and supply adjustments made in response 
to a tax, the actual burden of the tax does not necessarily fal l on the 
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individual or firm who makes payment. His adjustments to the tax influence 
"~o will bear the ultimate burden of the tax and whether or not the goals of 
equity and economic gro~vth will be fulfilled or repressed. It is not proba-
ble that a democratically determined tax policy will be optimal unless it is 
built with an understanding of the adjustments which determine the alloca-
tion of the ultimate burden , or incidence, of the tax. 
The Influence of Adjustments on Tax Incidence 
Tax capitalization 
Tax capitalization is a change in the market value of a property 
caused by the imposition or e limination of a tax . If the imposition of a 
ta." causes the market value of a property to fa ll, the owner will bear the 
current tax as well as all future taxes on the property even i f the property 
i s sold . The incidence of fu ture taxes or lack thereof rests with the cur-
r ent ovmer if full tax capitalization occurs. 
Forward shifting 
Fon11ard shifting involves a price increase which causes the tax to be 
borne by someone other than the person owning the tax base and making pay-
nent and incurring the initial i mpac t of the tax. 
Suppose a community wishes to tax its citizens according to their 
ability to pay . It imposes a progressive property tax taking a larger tax 
on lar ge properties p r esumably belonging to high income rather than of low 
incomes. This pattern of impact will achieve the desired pattern to inci -
dence only if the tax is not shifted . If the large property owners incur-
ring the i~pact of the progressive tax own business property and a r e able 
to recover the amount of the tax by raising the prices of their goods or 
5 
services , the incidence of the tax will be shifted or passed on to the pur-
chasers of goods and services . Purchasers ar e , of cour se, both low income 
and other high income people and, thus , whether or not this shifting by 
high income affects the final distribution of the total tax bur den among 
income groups depends on the algebraic sum of the shifts on individual s and 
groups with different levels o f income . If an individual high income per -
son shif t ing the t ax has enough parts of other people's tax shifted onto 
him, the pattern of t he distribution of the tax may be the same befor e and 
after the shifting . If, and mor e likely, the shifters ar e net shifters, 
they shift a larger dollar amount of tax than is shifted onto them. If t he 
higher income larger property owners shift some of their taxes to low income 
purchasers of goods , the pattern of incidence will differ f rom that of i m-
pact. A tax sys t em designed on the presumption of incidenc e equal to impact 
will not achieve the equitable distribution sought. 
If a tax is to associate payment with the benefits of the services 
provided with the revenues , then whether or not it is shifted also affects 
the achievement of the desired allocation of the burden . If , fo r example , 
new municipal parking facili t ies are financed by mercantile real property 
taxes which a r e shifted onto merchant r enters , the costs and benefits may 
be associated. If the tax is not shifted, the costs and benefits may be 
dissociated . Some special property taxes or assessments produce the desired 
incidence pattern only if the tax is not shifted, others only if they are 
shifted . 
It is also useful to know the incidence of taxes on r ental property 
when choosing a source of r evenue for the operation of schools and the city 
government. Only if t axes on apartment s are shifted onto t enants will there 
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be a contribution by non-property owners to school costs via property taxe s . 
Backward shifting 
If a t axpayer is able to recover his tax payment by r educing wages or 
avoiding a wage increase, he can shift the tax backward onto another r e -
source owner. Labor bears the burden or incidence of the tax through a 
smaller return than it would otherwise r eceive . I f a special charge for 
public sewage disposal permits a factory to avoid a needed wage increase for 
two or three years, the wor kers and t he connnunity may be paying several 
times more fo r the sewage plant than i f they had f inanced it f rom gener al 
r evenues. The community was, of course, seeking the association of costs 
and benefits through the special direct charge. However, the disruption in 
the expected wage trend which was caused by t he tax created a backward shift 
of the burden and dissociated the costs of the sewer from benefits which 
accrued to the company and the conununity . Since the burden of the t ax was 
shifted onto the workers not the company or the entire cotmnUnity, the costs 
and benefits a r e dissociated . Shifting can also contribute to the misallo-
cation of r esources toivard investments and improvements in properties which 
are able to shift taxes . }lisallocation of r esources leads to hindrance or 
retardation of economic growth in the community . 
Tax transformation 
Tax t r ans formation is a t erm used by E. R. A. Seligman (14, p . 6) to 
r efer to an adjustment in the process of production . The adjustment makes 
possible the r eduction of costs or an increase in the volume of production. 
The t axpayer r ecovers the tax by working har der or longer or by operating 
more efficiently r a t her than by shifting the tax onto someone else. Tax 
transformation not only does not shift the incidence of the t ax , but it also 
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promotes economic growth. Most adjustments to taxes shift the incidence and 
r educe the efficiency of resource use . Tax transformation can be illus -
trated on a diagram of a product transformation curve (see Figure 1). The 
r elationship between a merchant's output and costs is shown by point A 
prior to the tax increase. When faced with a tax increase he improves his 
position by reducing per unit costs. He may reduce costs while maintaining 
the same level of output and thus move toward point R on the trans formation 
curve . Or he may increase the volume of business while holding his costs 
constant and move toward point P on the curve. 
Shifting and Literature on Tax Incidence 
Theoretical works on taxation emphasize the importance of ascertaining 
the incidenc e of a tax by determining possibilities of shifting and other 
adjustments to the tax . Consider the following statements f rom Shifting 
and Incidence o f Taxation by Edwin R. A. Seligman: 
The problem o f the incidence of taxa tion is one of the 
most complicated, subjects in economic science . It has in-
deed been treated by many writers; but its discussion in 
scientific literature, as well as in everyday life, has fre -
quently been marked by what Parieu calls the "simplicity of 
i gnorance." Yet no topic in public finance is more impor-
tant; ... 
. . . The incidence of the tax is, therefore, the result 
o f the shifting , and the r eal economic problem lies in the 
nature of the shiftings . (14, p. 1) 
Theories about tax shifting specify numerous requisites fo r tax shift-
ing to take place and alternative circumstances under which it might occur. 
These circumstances include: (1) the nature of the tax--whether it is gen -
eral or discriminatory, whether it is large or small in amount, how it is 
assessed and administered; (2) t he competitive conditions in the r elevant 
0 
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Figure 1 . Pr oduct trans fonnation curve 
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mar kets; (3 ) the cost conditions of production ; and (4) the elasticity of 
demand . Ther e is not complete agreement among tax the~reticians as to t he 
r elative importance of these circums tances to shifting ability as t her e is 
not agr eement among economists in general as t o t he characteristics which 
determine the above circumstances . Presumably , if these circumstances 
could be empirically quantified , and if producer s and consumers behaved as 
hypo t hesized, then the ext ent of shifting might be calculable by a formul a. 
This is not currently possible . Problems exist in quantifying and isolating 
variabl es and estimating their affec t on shi f ting . These difficulties have 
inhibited economists and while t heoretica l works on shif ting abound , empiri-
cal studi es are scarce . 
Efforts to estimate tax burdens include only simplified assumptions on 
t ax shifting because theory hypothesizes r elationships too complex and ab-
str act to de t ermine empirically. A r ecent study compiled by the Tax Founda-
tion makes the following statement: 
The choice of assumptions on tax incidence is arbitrary , 
but also conventional .. . Sales taxes, exises and t he numerous 
taxes on business costs (including the proper ty t ax levi ed on 
business property) a r e assumed to be sh i fted f orward to the 
consumer. (18, p . 9) 
John Adler in "The Fiscal System, the Distribution of Income and Public 
Welfar e ," esti mates that two- thirds of property tax collections are f rom 
levies on per sonal property, owner occupied homes and farm land . Property 
t axes on these properties are assumed to be completely unshiftable . The 
r emaining one-third of property tax collections falling on business property 
and farm i mprovements a r e assumed to be completely shi fted forward (1, pp . 
414- 416) . These are probably overly simple assumptions . 
The assumption t hat taxes on business property are shifted forwar d 
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ignores theory's specifications with respect to elasticities and competi-
tive conditions in particular markets. Asstrrnptions t hat taxes on fa rm im-
provements a re shifted forward are especially subject to error. An empiri-
cal estimate of t ax incidence by Richard Musgrave and ot hers assumes that 
to the extent farm real estate taxes are on income producing , as opposed to 
residential facilities , they can be treated as an excise entering into the 
gen eral cost of doing business and are shifted ior ward (11, p. 23) . Rufus 
Tucker in a subsequent article on the distribution of tax burdens takes 
a~ception to the assumption used in the }fusgrave ar ticle and to the results 
of their study : 
It is an axiom of tax- shifting theory that the only way 
a person on whom a tax is i mposed can pass it on is by 
limiting the supply of the taxed article (or, in the case of 
backward shifting , limiting his demand for some other person's 
product). It is unusual and usually uneconomic fo r a farmer 
to limit his crops because of taxes; on the contrary he might 
~ttempt to increase his crops in order to be able to pay the 
taxes . . . For this r eason a very small part of the tax on farms 
might be shifted to consumers. (19, p . 279) 
Erroneous assumptions o~ tax shifting in studies of how the ta.~ burden 
i s aistributed aoong inco~e groups ar e acceptable if shifting does not 
appr eciably affect the way the t ax bur den is distributed among income 
groups . But if tax incidence is significantly affected by alternative 
"guesses" of tax shifting,a strong effort is needed to i mprove estimates 
and, hence , decisions in speci f ic tax policy decisions . 
A.-nong exceptions to the paucity of empirical works on shifting are 
The Shi f ting of the Corporation Income Tax by ~larian Kryzaniak and Richar d 
Husg:-ave (8) , and The Sales Tax in the American States by Robert }!urray Hai g 
and Carl Shoup (5) . Haig and Shoup dealt with the shifting of sales ta.~e s 
in a ~~nner similar to the way in which we shall examine property t ax shift-
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ing. They conducted interviews with businessmen to determine the extent to 
which shifting of sales taxes was a business practice in differ ent areas 
and for different types of business. The Iowa Tax Study (ITS) conducted by 
Iowa State University in 1965 took a similar approach to property tax 
shifting. One section of the questionnaire , shown in Appendix A, asked 
property owners questions relevant to action on several possible adjustments 
affecting incidence. These adjustments include forward and backward shift-
ing, tax capitalization, and tax transformation, and evasion through allow-
ing property to deteriorate. 
This thesis will use data obtained in the ITS to discern the extent to 
which Iowa property owners recognize and consciously engage in the above 
adjustments . The analysis will include comparisons of reactions among 
owners of differ ent properties and an attempt to explain the differences 
which arise due to variation in the type of property owned and other economic 
characteristics. 
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THE IOWA TAX STUDY 
Description of the Sample 
In 1965 Iowa State University conducted a study concerning property 
taxation in Iowa . About 900 Iowa property owners were visited and inter-
viewed to obtain information on property tax assessments and payments, pos-
sible shifting of property taxes, personal opinions with respect to taxes 
and local government , and other socio- economic characteristics such as in-
come, assets, employment, education and household composition . The 900 were 
chosen systematically so that they would adequately represent non- corporate 
Iowa residents who were owners of mercantile, residential and agricultural 
property in various geographical locations in Iowa. 
The sample of Iowa property owners who were interviewed was dravm from 
county courthouse tax files. The sample was stratified by dividing Iowa's 
99 counties into three groups . Group 1 counties were those whose largest 
city had a population of 50,000 or more; there were seven counties in this 
group . Group 2 counties were those whose largest city had a population be-
tween 5,000 and 49,999; 32 counties were in this group . Group 3 counties 
were those whose largest city had a population less than 5,000; there were 
60 counties in this group . All seven of the Group 1 counties were used in 
the survey . Eight counties were chosen systematically from each of the 
other two groups . A serpentine format was used in selecting these counties 
so that varied geographic areas would be r epresent ed in the sample (see 
Figure 2) . 
The county tax bill files of the 23 counties included in the study wer e 
then sampled to determine the property owners who would be interviewed . 
.SA C 
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Since the study was interes ted in the relationship of non- corporate Iowa 
r esident property owners to the property tax, the sampling procedure sought 
to give these households one and only one opportunity to enter the sample 
and to exclude property owned by corpor ations and non-Iowans . There were 
several difficulties to achieving this goal . Industrial properties were 
excluded because they ar e generally owned by corporations . Corporations 
which owned other types of property did have the possibility o f entering the 
sampl e , but t hese properties were analyzed separately. Out-of- state resi -
dent property owners theoretically should have been included , but were also 
excluded because of the difficulty of conducting an interview with them. 
Other non-corporate resident property owners did not have an opportunity to 
enter the sample i f their credits and /or exemptions nullified their tax. 
Their names were not listed in the tax bill f iles and hence they could not 
be in the sample. 
Residents who owned mor e than one property were given but one chance to 
be a part of the sample. Mercantile , agricultural and residential proper-
ties were sampled at different rates, 1/266, 1/1600, and 1/1600 respectively . 
If a person owned mercantile property he entered the sample at the rate of 
1/266 and all other properties owned by the household entered coincidently. 
If he owned agricultural property, and no mercantile, he entered the sample 
a t the rate for agricultural properties; all other agricultural and resi -
dential properties owned by the household also became a part of the sampl e . 
If he owned residential property only, he entered the sample at the rate for 
residential property . If an individual or household owned property in more 
than one county, he was allowed to enter the sample only in the county in 
which he owned residential personal property . 
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Though numerous difficulties were encountered due to lack of standar d 
methods of filing the tax bills in different counties , those who worked to 
design the study and to draw the Sil!l'lple were successful in obtai ning a sam-
ple tri.th the desired characteristics . The final sample of 926 property 
owners included 829 non-corporate Iowa residents, information f rom and about 
which will be used in this report on tax shifting . 
Limitations and Advantages of the Data 
Two populations 
The member s of t he sample were visited and interviewed during the sum-
mer of 1965 to verify information on taxes, assessments , property ownership , 
and location gleaned from tax records and to obtain new information. Be-
cause of the different sampling rates and the stratific ation of the sample, 
the schedules had to be given different weights before the information could 
be tabulated and analyzed. 
Since the property tax is levied on properties, but is paid by indi-
viduals, firms, or households, a study of property tax shi ft ing is actually 
working with two populations--properties and property owners. The number of 
properties in the sample was determined by the owners. Each property which 
the owner considered to be a separate economic entity was given an economic 
unit number and is considered a property. Since an individual or household 
can own sever al properties, the sample and population of properties is con-
siderably larger than those of property owners . The sample of properties 
included 131 mercantile real properties. Approximately one- third of these 
were completely or partly rented out; the remaining two- thirds were used in 
the owner's business. The sample included 326 agricultural real properties; 
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151, or almos t one-half of which are rented out. Of the 621 residential 
real properties in the sample , we are mainly interested in the 85 which wer e 
all or partly r ented out since there is almos t no opportunity for shi f ting 
the taxes on owner occupied dwellings . A few, 21 to be exact , residential 
real properties were u sed in relation to an income produc ing activity . 
They were classif ied as residential because the business function of the 
property was quite secondary to the housing function. 
' In this study of tax shifting the population o f pr operties is as 
relevant or more r elevant than the population of property owners since the 
owner r esponds to a tax on each property . It is with regard to this matter 
that we meet a serious deficiency in the data. The information obtained is 
in reference to only one economic unit of each kind--mercantile, agricul-
tural, or residential--of property owned. On the f irst page of Section IV 
of the questionnaire, 1 the owner was asked to supply information on the 
value and use o f each economic unit he owned . However, on the following 
page which begins to deal directly with shifting and other adjustments to 
a 20 per cent tax increase, he is asked to r espond with r efer ence to only 
one economic unit of each kind . Since the ques tionnaire was quite long , 
this was done to conserve time . The interviewer determined which unit of 
each kind to use by re ferring to a random number s t able . 
A hypo t hetica l example will suggest the di fficulty which arises . Sup-
pose a household owned one mercantile and two residential properties, one o f 
which was occupied by the family , the other being r ented out. The owner 
would give answers representing his reaction to a ta.~ increase on the mer-
1
see Appendix A. 
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cantile property and on one of the residential properties . If the owner ' s 
home was selected using the random numbers procedure , then all answers , in-
cluding the value and the amount of the tax , which refer to the residential 
real pr operty of that schedule refer to the owner occupied residence . No 
answer s would have been given where rental property is consider ed . In fact 
there would be no trace of this rental property in this study . Instead , 
the answers gi ven in r esponse to the owner s occupied r esidenc e wou ld be 
weighted by two to represent the two residential real proper ties owned by 
the respondent. Throughout the schedul e the answer s ar e given we i ghts on 
the basis of the county from which the property was sampled and the kind of 
property . The weights give the sample a proper relationship with the 
populatio::l of property O\mers in Iowa. In order to move t:o the population 
of r eal properties in Section IV, the answers in this section are given an 
adcitional weight which is the nu.'nber of properties of a particular kind 
owned by the s ampled household . All tabulations of answers and informati on 
in this study are in terms of properties rather than households . 
The fact that answers are lioited to only o n e unit o £ e a ch 
kind of property hinders the ability of this study to evaluate relationships 
among variables about which the survey obtained information. We might wish 
to consider a relationship between shifting ability and sales . Often, how-
ever, a property for which the owner refused to or could not supply this 
information was selected while a property for which value and sales informa-
tio::i was co:nplete was passed over. 
In the portions of the questionnaire and analysis which deal with 
agricultural and mercantile personal property, the populations of proper-
ties and property owners are the same. All mercantile personal pr operty 
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owned by one household is aggregated . Agricultural personal property is 
handled similarly. No weights additional to those used throughout the 
schedule are necessary. 
I ncomplete s chedules 
The data a lso suffers from the failure of sample member s to supply the 
requested information . Some of t he questions were applicable only to 
owners of a certain type of property, but many property owners failed to 
answer questions which were applicable to them either because they did not 
know the answer or did not wish to make it known. This again restricts the 
identification of relationships by limiting the sample size for which values 
of all variables are known. 
Opinions as data 
An i mportant characteristic of the data is that they represent opin-
ions. There are a number o f drawbacks to relying on opinions in ana lysis 
of tax shifting. There is absolutely no guarantee that the taxpayer could 
actually do what he think s he could do. Upon consideration of the theory 
of shifting , it seems as though it would be accidental if what a r espondent 
r eplied that he thought he could recover is in fact what he could r ecover. 
A r espondent's ability to evaluate his shifting ability decreases when 
there are a fai r ly large number of suppliers and his oppor tunity for shift -
ing the tax depends on other s ' actions as well as his own . Since most 
businessmen have experienced tax increases before and are probably fami liar 
with the r esponses within t heir market , their opinion is something of an 
approximation to shifting ability . 
A second problem in dealing with opinions is that we cannot be certain 
that the respondent is not intentionally giving misleadi ng answers in t he 
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hope of affecting policy in the desired direction--avoiding a tax increase . 
A taxpayer (who cannot shift the tax) might say that he could r ecover a tax 
increase by raising prices, thinking that policy makers would find pric e 
increases undesirable and, therefore, refrain from increasing the tax. On 
the other hand, a ta.~payer may seek to arouse sympathy by emphasizing the 
burden that the tax will place on his own business when in fact he can 
1 shift part or all of the tax forward. Since deliberate fals i f ication can 
affect answers in either direction, it would probably not severely bias the 
data. More importantly , since Iowa State University is not in a policy mak-
ing position, it is not unreasonable to assume that respondents did not seek 
to bias the results and answered to the best of their ability . 
Working with opinions has one particular advantage for analyzing tax 
shifting . It allows us to focus on the tax as the cause of a change in be-
havior. Analysis of shifting through observing prices before and after a 
tax increase does not pennit this to as great an extent. With such after 
the fact analysis, we could not be sure whether a tax increase prompted a 
change in price o~ whether the same forces effecting t he tax increase also 
caused the price c hange . Moreover , there would be no information on the 
mechanism through which the shifting took place. Results would tend to re-
fleet price changes which took place shortly after the tax increase, i gnor -
1 
A business can shift the entire tax forward and yet incur a decline 
in profits . Seligman describes this phenomenon as the 11pr essure of taxa-
tion11 (14, p. 11). The businessman raises prices enough to shift a unit 
tax forward, but experiences a decline in net revenue due to a decr ease in 
sales. The property t ax is a bit different since the unit of taxation is 
not associated with a unit of sales . Full forward shifting of the tax c an 
be said to occur only if t he property owner increases his total net revenue 
by an amount equal to the tax payment. 
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ing subsequent shifti ng which comes about t hrough a decline in inves tment . 
Long run and short run 
Our anal ysis encount ers a similar probl em s ince t he t ime hori zon of t he 
answering pr oper ty owner i s pr obably quite shor t . We would expec t t hat a 
property O>vner is consi der ing a time period of not more t han thr ee years 
when he answers t hat he c an or c anno t r ecover a tax increas e by r aising 
price s or r ent. I f h e c annot r ais e pri c e s within this per iod, a s far a s he 
i s concer ned , he s i mply cannot shi f t t he tax . Ac t ua l shifting , however, may 
r equir e a period o f time longer than thr ee ye ar s to work i t se l f out and 
night not, ther efore , be per cei ved by t he shi fter . The increased f i xed 
costs o f la~ger property taxes might eventually squeez e mar gina l producers 
out of business; supply would then be r educ ed and t he r emai ning sel ler s will 
be able to raise their prices . Or the i ncr ease i n property taxes might 
prevent new suppliers from entering the market . An i nc r ease in demand , 
with supply remai ning the same , would permi t suppl i er s to r a i se prices to 
recover the tax . 
Because property owners tend to look at shifti ng as something to be 
done within a short period of time follo·wi.ng a tax incr ease , we c an expec t 
property ovmers to underestimate their actual shifting ability . Investment 
responses to a tax increase indicate l ong- r un adjustments to the tax and the 
extent to which shifting which is not percei ved by the shifter occurs . If 
a tax increase discourages investment, then the supply wi l l event ually be 
reduced or >vill grow less rapidly than in the absence of t he t ax . This may 
lead to some forward shifting of the tax . 
The mar ginal nature o f the data 
The questions posed by the ITS to ascertai n pr operty owner s ' reactions 
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to and ability to shi ft property taxes were to be answer ed with reference 
to a 20 per cent incr ease in prope r ty tax payments. Si nce answers refer to 
a tax increase , they reflect marginal behavior . We cannot use the informa-
tion to estimate total shifting, bu t we can evaluate tax changes with re-
spect to shifting . Since property taxes have been incr easing steadily , 
questions concerning r esponses to a tax increase allowed r espondents to use 
a frame of reference that was familiar . Thus they probably gave r ather r e-
liable answer s. More abstract questions such as, "Do you currently shift 
property taxes? " would probably have produced less reliab le answers . 
In this study we use property owners' answers to questions concer ning 
r eactions to a 20 per cent tax increase . Questions asked about the effects 
of a property ta."C increase on investment and how much of the tax could be 
recovered by i ncr easing prices or sales , or by r educing costs. Full recog-
nition should be given to the uncertainty of property owners' knowledge of 
actual shifting ability. The answers give an indication of pr oper ty owner s ' 
opinions on what they could do to shift a tax increase. 
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FINDINGS 
This chapter reports the answers to the questions which the ITS posed 
to property owners about tax shifting and capitalization. Classification of 
properties and respondents plus economic theory and speculation are used to 
interpret the respondents' answers and to gain understanding of the adjust -
ments to property tax increases in Iowa . Charts and tables are used to re-
port visually and quantitatively how Iowa property owners responded. 
Tax Capitalization 
The survey asked each property owner the following question about each 
of his properties. 
What do you feel would happen to the market value of 
this property as a result of a 20 per c ent increase in 
property taxes? 
Possible answers were: Increase; Decrease; Remain unchanged . 
If the property owner says that an increase in his property tax will 
decrease the market value of his property, he is indicating a belief that 
all or part o f the tax vri.11 be capitalized. That is, he expects that the 
tax cannot be completely shifted, but part of it will reduce his net income . 
For inco~e producing land or property, the market value is related to the 
size of the expected future stream of income produced . If the net r eturn 
from a piece of land is $2000 and the capitalization rate for this type of 
investment is 4 Jer cent , then, according to the capitalization method of 
determining market value, the selling price would be $2000/.04 or $50,000 . 
Let us suppose that there had been a $250 tax on this land so the before 
tax annual net income would have been $2250 . A 20 per cent increase in this 
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tax would reduce annual net income by $50 to $1950 . Assuming that there 
was no change in the capitalization rate, the market value of the pr operty 
wou l d have fal l en to $1950/ . 04 or $48, 750. The mar ket va l ue of the property 
was $1250 less because of a $50 change in the tax . 
Econorr~c theory sets a number of requisites for capitalization to 
(1) The tax cannot be shifted. 1 If the tax can be shifted, then occur. 
it will not r educe net income and therefore will not be capitalized into a 
r educed selling price . (2) The rate of r eturn of all capital is not 
affected by the tax increase (4, p . 366) . If a property tax increase were 
complete in its coverage of all forms of assets, the r ate of return on all 
capital might be reduced by the tax increase . The capitalization rate 
would then be lower and the market value of individual proper ties might not 
suffer as a r esult o f the tax . The proper ty tax is far from being a unif orm 
tax on all capital . Some capital assets are not subject to property taxa-
tion; millage levies differ from district to district; and sales value t o 
assessment value ratios vary f rom property to property . Therefore, to t he 
extent the property tax is not shifted, it is likely to be capitalized . 
Increased proper ty taxes also lead to declines in the values of owner 
occupied homes . Even though there is no money income produc ed by an owner 
occupied house, the cost of the housing service provided is increased . As 
the price increases, the quantity demanded in the city or area of the 
property tax increase is diminished . This can be illustrated by an exampl e . 
If two homes are comparable in every respect except taxes, the one with 
1 
See Appendix B for a consistency check of answers given by proper ty 
owners . 
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higher property taxes would be expected to have a lower selling price . The 
r eason is that buyers substitute the lower taxed houses for the higher 
taxed ones until the prices adjust to the equilibrium differential . Even if 
t he taxes on al l houses are increased, prices of houses can decrease as a 
r esult o f substitution. There will be some substitution of non-housing for 
housing purchases because of the higher housing tax and cost . 
Respondents to the ITS generally felt a tax increase would decrease the 
value of their property (see Figure 3) . Some properties (2 - 10 per cent) a r e 
owned by persons who believed that an increase in proper ty taxes would in-
crease the value of their property . This response is surprising and proba-
bly indicates the r espondent did not understand property tax capitalization . 
However, r espondents might also have thought that public services would be 
better as a r esult of tax increases and these public services woul d increase 
property values . Some may have experienced past property value increases 
r egularly and fel t that strong forces increasing property values would per-
sist and increase property values even with a tax increase. The respondents 
were asked to assume that 11all conditions except taxes r emained unchanged . 11 
This condition may have been misunderstood by a few or they failed to fo llow 
the thinking process which the question sought to invoke . 
A tax increase would not affect the market value of 40- 50 per cent of 
proper ties . Several situations could have led property owners to answer 
that a property ta.x increase would l eave the property value unchanged . 
(1) The dollar amount o f the tax increase is so small that it would not in-
fluence prospective buyer s . (2) The property tax could be shifted . (3) The 
property owner felt that the tax would simply offset s t rong forc es which 
would otherwise have increased the property's value . (4) The property owner 
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Table 1 . Effect of a property ta.~ increase on the marke t value of rental 
and non- rental residential property 
Market value 
effect 
Increase 
Decrease 
No effect 
Total 
Rented· 
out 
1. 6 % 
62 . 2 
36.2 
100 . 0 
Use of Eroperty 
Partly rented Not rented 
out out 
3 . 5 % 10 .1 % 
52.8 40.1 
49 . 9 43.7 
100 . 0 100.0 
felt that all properties in the area would be affected similarly by a tax 
increase and thus other purchases would decrease but quantity demanded and 
pr ices of real estate w'Ould remain constant. 
The proportion of r esidential property owned by respondents who expect 
a decline in market value is 50 per cent and smaller than the proportion 
(51 to 55 per cent) of mercantile or of agricultural properties who expect 
a property value decline in response to tax increases (see Figure 3) . This 
is not expected from shifting theory. There is a stronger probability of 
shifting and thus l ess expectation of tax capitalization on income producing 
properties . All agricultural and mercantile property is income producing 
while only 17 per cent of residential is . We would, f or the same reason 
expect that a smaller proportion of r esidential rental properties than owner 
occupied residences would experience a decline in value as the result of a 
tax increase. In fact, the opposite is the case (see Table 1). Owners of 
62 . 2 per cent of properties which are r ented out, compared to 40 . 1 per cent 
of properties which are not rented out, felt a tax increase would cause a 
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decrease in the market value of their properties . 
The unexpected pattern of answers on tax capitalization occurs because 
owners of income producing properties are more aware of the tax capitaliza-
tion process and recognize more ful ly its influence on the mar ket value of 
their property than do home owners. Even if a portion of the tax can be 
shifted, the typical businessman or landlord realized that it could not all 
be shifted and that, on a rental or business property, the remainder o f the 
tax w·ould be capitalized into a r educed selling price. Owner s of their own 
single fanu ly res idences, on the other hand, probably had less understand-
ing of tax capitalization and , there fore, less o f ten r ecognized the effect 
of taxes on the value of their property. Responses to this question a re 
probably honest, but the degree of tax capitalization is probably under-
estimated both absolutely and relatively among home owners. 
A property tax increase would decrease the value to some extent of at 
least 50 per cent of real properties in Iowa. Such t ax capitalization a lso 
indicates that current owners are benefited relative to future owners by 
property tax cuts . 
Investment 
Property owners were asked how a 20 per cent tax increase would affect 
t heir investment in property subject to the tax. Owners of over 60 per cent 
of real properties said a tax increase would discourage their investment . 
In contrast over 60 per cent of personal property owners indicated they 
would not alter their invest~ents in equipment , inventory or livestock . 
Thus property tax increases seem likely to be more discouraging for rea l 
estate improvements tha n store inventories and other working capital like 
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beef cows. 
Investment decisions are long run decisions and are in principle influ-
enced by the costs and returns expected on the investment in the future . 
Thus a tax increase could logically discourage investment and thus decrease 
product supply, increase product price, and thus shift the tax and change 
the incidence. Thus consumers would soon suffer with less goods and higher 
prices as a result of property tax increases. Professor Vickrey, . an econo-
mist, also has suggested that any disincentive effect on investment by 
property taxes causes a burden also to be shifted onto future generations 
in the form of a smaller stock of capital (9, p . 286). 
Another effect of curtailed investment resulting from property tax in-
creases might be to capital and hence for labor used by the construction in-
dustry. If the housing industry makes fewer improvements, the demand for 
painters and the services of small contractors will decline . To the extent 
that this fa ll in demand f orces reduction in the quantity utilized and the 
prices paid for these services, the adjustment to the property tax can be 
shifted backward to the construction indus try. The amount of effect on the 
construction can be larger or smaller than the t ax obtained; because tax 
on an apartment house is i ncreased $1000 , the owner may delay repainting 
for a year or so and thus deny income to painters of well over $1000. 
If investment is discouraged, after a time savers will also fee l the 
effects of the tax (12, p. 36) . The demand for loanable funds could de-
crease enough to cause interest rates to fall . A tax increase may make home 
owners less ·willing to incur a mortage in order to make i mprovements; others 
may become less inclined to buy a home. If the supply of savings remains 
unchanged and demand for loanable funds fo r non real estate or non local 
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uses docs not rise, savers may be adversely affected through a lower return . 
The size of the effect on savers c annot be determined as any definite pro-
portion or multiple of the tax increase . 
Of course if a tax on r ental housing discourages investment, deteriora-
tion in the quality of housing will result . If this deterioration in qual-
ity is not accompanied by a corresponding decline in r ent , which it could 
not be if shifting were to take place , a burden resulting from adjustment 
to t he tax is placed on t he tenant even though the rent is not raised . 
James Heilbrun (6) traces the investment effects of a property tax in-
crease on the rental housing industry . He considers a tax on the combined 
value of the site and imp~ovement . This is typical of local property taxes 
in the United States. The tax, he says, would not affect the operating out-
lays or short- run expenditures of the landlord so the condition of the 
s~ructures would remain unchanged in the short-run . The tax would, however , 
restrain construction of new housing . Thus the supply would grow less fast 
than demand and r ents would rise, thus making it possible , Heilbrun says, 
for the portion of t he tax falling on the building to be shifted . 
If , as in the ITS results, investment is discouraged, old housing in-
volving the gr eatest degree of dilapidation and design obsolescence would 
be most effected . Thus these old low r ent houses may be first to be elimin-
ated from the supply allowing taxes to be most easily shifted to tenants of 
this type of housing (see Table 2) (7, pp. 91- 92) . The ITS says investmen~ 
would be inhibited most in ~hose rental properties which had experienced a 
decli~e in value over the five years preceding the survey. Depreciation 
and the removal of improvements were the main reasons fo r declining value 
of property . Since older buildings are probably occupied by families o f 
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Table 2. The effect of a property tax increase on landlords' investment by 
the change i n the value of the pr operty which had occurred in the 
five years preceding the sur vey 
Investment effect Past change in value 
Incr~asc No change Decrease 
Discourage 66 . 9% 76 .1% 100 . 0% 
No effect 33 .1 23 . 9 0 . 0 
Total 100 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 
lower income, the result i s that low income families would f irs t bear a bur -
den from investment discouraged by property tax increase . A large portion 
of a property tax increase is probab ly shifted fo rward on old, poor quality 
r ental housing . 
The decline in investment reported by al l types o f property owners due 
to a t ax incr ease would fall partly on suppliers of c api t al , partly on the 
labor used in produci ng it and partly on consumers. The total e ffect may 
be larger or smal l e r in value than the ta.x increase . 
A tax increase is expected by the respondents to have a much larger 
negative efiect on investment by real property ovmers than by owners of 
agricultural and mercantile personal property (see Fi gure 4) . Owners of a 
few pieces of mercantile personal property said the tax increase would cause 
them to go out o f business . The business would have t o be very marginal 
for a tax increase of 20 per cent to be large enough r elative to total costs 
and t:otal sales to logically explain 11 going out of business . 11 On the 
aver age a businessman ' s tax on rea l proper ty will be greater relative to the 
gros s r eturn on the property t han his tax on per sonal property . On mcrcan-
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Table 3 . Per cent of properties within a tax increase group which would 
incur a decline in investment by type of pr oper ty 
Type of property Amount of tax increase 
$0- $24 $25 - $49 $50- $99 $100- $199 Over $200 
Mercantile 55.5% 64 . 6% 79 . 8% 70 . 5% 62 . 4% 
r eal 
Agr i cultura l 40 . 6 43 . 4 45. 9 60 . 6 59.9 
r eal 
Residential 47.1 62 . 6 75 .1 66 . 5 100. 0 
real 
Nercanti l e 25 . 0 27 . 7 36 . 2 24 . 6 56 . 9 
per sonal 
tile personal property the tax is very small r elative t o total sales and 
tot al costs . The amount of the tax, however , does not explain the lar ger 
investment r esponse on real than on personal pr operty . For every tax in-
crease of a certain size a large proportion of real than personal proper-
ties would decrease investment (see Table 3) . This might not be expected 
since it is easier to disinvest in inventory and facilities less durable 
than a structure . On the other hand, a business depends more on its inven-
tory and equipment than on the physical condition of its plant . 
The answers given by owners o f agricultural per sonal property (see 
Figure 4) offer an opportunity for speculation into their reasons for giv-
ing such answers. Although most r esponded that the tax increase would not 
influence their investment decisions, note that 8 . 7 per cent said that the 
tax increase would cause them to increase their investment in livestock . 
This might be because certain animals are not taxed . Another possible ex-
planation for this answer has been suggested to me . Work with livestock is 
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a rather unremunerative activity in terms of income per hour of work . But 
much of the work is done at times which might other~nse be leisure time--
early mornings , evenings and winters. It is possible that farmers who would 
increase their livestock investment would be substituting labor for leisure 
in an effort to maintain the income level they had before t he t ax increase . 
The 11.9 per c ent who would decrease investment in livestock r ealized that, 
after a tax increase, they would be earning even less in their mar ginal 
hours of work and concluded that it would no longer be worthwhile . Those 
who would increase livestock have a greater mar ginal preference for income 
than for leisure , and those who would decrease livestock have a gr eater 
mar ginal pr eference for l eisure . 
The opinions expressed by Iowa property owners in response to the ITS 
support the hypothesis that property taxes discourage investment . Nearly 
70 per cent of mercantile and agricultural properties and 60 per cent of 
residential properties would suffer a decrease in investment if property 
taxes were increased . Owners were in effect saying that they would be un-
vnlling or unable to accept a lower return on new investment ·while at the 
same time bearing larger f ixed costs on their current stock of property . 
The widespr ead reported discouragement of investment which Iowa 
property owners would feel if their property taxes increased by 20 per cent 
suggests that the costs of having these funds removed from the private sec -
tor through property taxation might exceed the benefits of having the funds 
channeled through the public sector. The amount of investment discouraged 
by the tax in one year may cause a burden on labor, savers, renters, proper-
ty owners and society in general which exceeds the amount of the tax . 
After a period of time a property owner may realize that he can raise 
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prices, shifting the tax, and resume or e>.."Pand his pattern of investment. 
Ability to Recover the Tax by Reducing Costs 
The ITS asked how much of a 20 per cent tax increase could be recovered 
by reducing costs. An answer that all or part of the tax could be r ecovered 
by cutting expenses suggests that part of the tax may be shifted back to 
the suppliers of the items whose demand was decreased by efforts to econo-
mize. A positive answer to the question also means that the property owner 
was not in a profit maximizing position before the tax increase. 
Only an insignificant number o f property owners, less than 5 per cent , 
felt they could r ecover any of a tax increase by reducing costs (see 
Figure 5) . From this we can conclude that most property owners felt that 
they were approximating a profit maximizing position or one which their 
prefer ences would not allow to be changed by the tax increase. Answers also 
suggest that there would be very little backward shifting as the result of 
short-run decisions to reduce eA'"Penses . In general a property tax increase 
would affect other costs so slightly that this adjustment can be ignored in 
estimating the incidence of the t ax. 
Ability to Recover the Tax by Increasing the Volume of Business 
Property owners who used their property in their own businesses were 
asked if they could r ecover any of a property tax increase by increasing 
t heir volume of business without increasing prices or costs. The question 
is similar to the pr evious one in t hat it concerns tax transformation; how-
ever, the responses were quite different. While less than 5 per c ent would 
r educe costs, between 10 and 25 per cent o f properties had owners who felt 
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they could recover all or part of the tax by increasing the volume of 
business (see Figure 6) . 
A greater proportion of agricultural, than mercantile or residential 
property owners would try to recover the tax increase by increasing their 
volu~e of business . This is probably because farmers have less opportunity 
to shift their taxes than do owners of other types of pr operty . Also the 
far:ners' working time c an be varied more easily than that of other business-
rr.er:. . '''hen a property owner answers that he can recover the tax by incr eas -
ing his volume of business without raising costs, he is indicating a will -
ingness to work harder. The leisure of the property owner rather than his 
net inco::-.e or the consumer rs r eal income bears the tax . 
To the a~tent that a property tax increase causes property owners t o 
increase their volume of business, the tax encouraged gro1·Tth. The tax 
increase will bring in the revenue it was designed to produce and the pat -
tern o f incidence will be unaffected . 
Ability to Recover the Tax by Raising Rent 
0:1.e question asked : 11How much, i f any , of this tax increase could you 
recover by increasing rent?" This question approaches shifting directly 
through the relationship between the tax and the owner '·s pricing decision 
rather than indirectly through the consequences of his and others' invest-
n:ent decisions . 
The ability to shift the property tax forward in the relatively short 
:::un depends on narket demand and the competitive position of the supplier. 
Forward shi.::ting nay be possible if the demand is inelastic. If, for 
exa:nple, there is always someone waiting to rent a certain property should 
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it become vacant, ~he property owner could probably increase rents and still 
keep his property ful l y rented. This ability to keep a property fully 
rented while increasing rents implies that the property owner commanded ex-
cess market power before t he tax increase, or that there was an excess 
demand which the pr icing mechanism had not eliminated . A landlord would 
have refrained f rom r aising rents in the absence of a t ax increase if he 
felt that raising r ents would encourage an increase in the supply of r ental 
housing. If t he general level of rents increased, other property owners 
might find it worthwhile to rent out rooms in their homes, or contractors 
and real estate dealers might find it profitable to construct new rental 
housing units. The resulting increase in supply 'WOul d infringe upon the 
individual landlord's market position . After a tax increase, however, new 
construction would be inhibited as we noted above,
1 
preventing the increase 
in supply . Competition could still come from ovmer occupied residences who 
hoped to recover a part of their own tax increases by renting out a portion 
of their homes . If the tax increase led all landlords to attempt to shift 
the tax forward, they would probably meet with success . 
In the case of agricultural land, the ability to shift the tax onto 
tenants in the short run also depends on the demand for rental land by 
tenants or pot ent i al t enants . A person who owns agricultural property and 
has rented it out has three alternatives when faced with a tax increase . 
(1) He can increase the rent he is charging tenants shifting part or all of 
the burden onto them. (2) He can continue operating as before and bear the 
tax himself. (3) He can sell the land and bear the future taxes capitalized 
1 
See p . 28 . 
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into a decline in the property's market val ue . The first action is prefer -
able to the landlord . However , it wil l successfull y r e lieve him of the tax 
burden only i f he c an continue to rent out the property at a higher rent. 
Since the profit margin of the tenant may be quite l ow, an increased r ental 
charge could caus e the tenant to move elsewhere or to leave farming alto-
gether . 
The shi f ting of mercanti l e property taxes onto tenants wor ks similarly . 
If the tenant is doing well enough that he can and will bear a portion of 
t he owner ' s tax to r emain in his present location, the tax can be shifted . 
Nost owners of r ental property do not feel t hat they could directly 
shift a tax increase onto tenants (see Figure 7). There is considerable 
variation in presumed shifting ability among different kinds of property. 
Mercantile property owners indicate a much greater ability to recover the 
tax increase by increasing rent . Over 54 per cent of mercantile properties 
compared to 9.6 per cent for agricultural and 22 . 8 per cent for residential 
could shift the tax onto tenants . An explanation for the variation in 
answers among property types is related to the elasticity of demand for 
t enancy in the properties. 
We would expect a fairly high elasticity of demand for t enancy on a 
specific agricultural property . Most agricultural pr operty o~mers felt 
that their tenants would find another parcel of land to farm rather than 
pay a higher r ent . This implies that the demand for rental agricultural 
land in general is elastic . Let us assume that prior to the tax increase 
the market had reached an equilibrium in which al l properties ar e rented 
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out, and t hat the supply of rental land is inelastic . 
1 If t he l andlord 
attempts to r aise the rent, the tenant has t he alternatives of leaving 
farming , buying a farm, or bearing the tax in t he f orm of higher r ent. 
Most agricultural property owners fel t that their tenants would take one of 
the f ormer actions r a t her than pay a higher rent . 
In the c ase of residential rea l property the elasticity of demand for 
a specific room or str ucture may also be quite high. Whether or not a land-
lord i;v:i.11 attempt to raise the rent to recover a tax increase depends on 
what he thinks his tenants would do in response to the rise, and whether he 
thinks other suppliers of housing are at tempting to raise rents . Let us 
assume that in the event of a rent increase a ll tenants would move into a 
unit of equal f loor spac e to their current accorranodations, but of lower 
quality . Under this condition a landlord who felt that landlor ds owning 
higher quali ty proper ty would raise r ents could fee l assur ed of shifting 
his ta.'< for ward and keeping his p r operty fully rented. But at least one 
landlord would have to be acting under a wrong presupposition, because the 
oi;.mer of the hi ghest quality would not be able t o shift the tax under the 
assumptio:i that tenants would move into lower quality housing . This 
assumption might be wrong ; those residing in the highest quality may be 
\v:i.lling to pay a higher rent rather than move into lower quality hous i ng . 
At any race, a landlord bases his ability to shift on being able to keep 
the property fully l et at a higher rent . If he thinks he can do this , he 
thinks he can shift the tax increase . Landlords O\·ming about 25 per c ent 
1 
The supply of renta l land could increase to the extent that farmers 
take up other occupations or r etire and rent out their land rather than 
sell it . 
42 
of r esidential proper ties think they could do this to recover all or part 
of a 20 per cent tax increase (see Figur e 7). 
}1ercantile property owners indicate a much gr eater ability to shift 
the tax onto t enants. This may be due ro the uniqueness of a location or 
struct ure fo r a particular business and the ability of the tenant to bear a 
higher rent cost. These make his demand fo r a particular property less 
elastic than demands for agricultural or r esidential property . 
Demand for occupancy of a particular parcel of land or building is 
probably a major determinant o f its value . We would expect owners whose 
properties have increased in value to possess greater ability to shift 
their property taxes directly onto tenants . Infonnation from the ITS sup-
ports this idea. For each type of property a greater proportion o f proper-
ties which had increased in value during the five years preceding the sur -
vey indicated an ability to r ecover a t ax increase by increasing rent (see 
Fi gure 8). The direction of a change in value of a rental property seems 
to be a consistent determinant of shifting abili ty . 
Ability to Recover the Tax by Increasing Prices 
The ITS contained questions concerning direct forward shifting o f 
taxes on properries used by the owner's business . The owner was asked how 
much of a 20 per cent tax increase he could recover by raising prices. 
In economic theory on t ax shifting , r eal estat e taxes are generally 
analyzed in two parts--one part being the t ax on land, the other being the 
tax on the improvement . In the case o f a tax on agricultural real property, 
the part of the tax on land is predominant . Ability to shift depends on 
how the tax is assessed . If, for example , the tax is assessed according to 
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Rica r dian rent, the tax cannot be shifted and the bur den will r es t with the 
owner . According to this theory of rent, prices are deterrr~ned by land 
which pays no rent. Therefore a t ax on rent could not affect prices; there 
could be no forward shifting . Under this situation mar ginal land would be 
tax free (14, p . 258) . If, however, the tax is assessed at a cer tain 
amount per acre, ignoring variations in the quality of the land , the tax 
may be shifted to t he consumer because the price r equired to keep marginal 
land in production wou ld have risen. Keither of these examples fits the 
case of the typica l American tax on agricultural real property. Local 
property taxes are based on an assessed value which is determined by var-
ious characteristics anc which is related t:o the mar ket value of the 
property . What: see:ns to be relevant in an analysis of agricultural proper ty 
tax shifting is the response o f the farmer to a rise in f i xed costs. If he 
would restrict production or allow himself to go out of business, there is 
a possibi lity that the tax will be shifted . Observation of the econor:li.c 
behavi or of farmers indi cates that they are unlikely to curtail pr oduction 
if there is a property t ax increase . Sone may go out of business after a 
time, but the aggregate supply of agricultural produce is not likely to de -
cline even then because of economies of scale and i mproving technology . 
Since the supply would not be decreased, shifting would not occur. 
The answers represented by agricultural properties in the ITS coincide 
with what theory and behavioral assumpt ions hypothesize (see Figure 9). 
The icw farners who said they could recover all or part of the tax could 
have been nistaken, or they could tave been dealing in a specialized service 
or product which would make it possible to shift the tax by vir tue of the 
nature of the demand fo r the service-- for example, a breeding farm . 
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Turning to urban r eal properties, the distinction between the tax fal -
ling on the site value and that falling on the building becomes more signi -
fi c ant in theory. However, questions and answers in the ITS do not dis -
tinguish between a t ax on the site and that on the building . Since the 
assessment is based on the combined value of both the site and the building , 
it does not seem very useful to apply the distinction between site and im-
provement in this ana l ysis . Instead we shall consider the nature of the 
business and the conditions o f demand and supply for its products or ser-
vices, and the amount of tax relative to the volume of business. 
Forward shifting primarily concerns mercantile properties . Very few 
agricultural property owners thought they could recover a t ax increase by 
raising prices. A comparatively large proportion of property owners oper-
ating a business in connection with residential property felt they could 
recover a tax increase by raising prices (see Figure 9) . This r esul t could 
be due to the specialized nature of the service or product involved . The 
sample of residential properties used in businesses is too small to permit 
a more detailed analysis . The samples of mercantile personal and mercantile 
real property owners answering that they could shift the tax is large 
enough to ana l yze in more detail. 
We can hypothesize that ability to recover the tax by raising prices 
is r e lated to the type o f business, the economic conditions in the area, 
and the ratio of sales to the amount of the tax increase. The ITS contains 
information on the type of business in which mercantile personal property 
was used . This information does not apply to mercantile real property even 
though it was owned by the same household . The unit of mercantile real 
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pr operty selected for analysis in ques tion s1 might not be used in the same 
business as the personal property. The mercantile real property may be 
. 2 rented out i nstead . 
Other information is available to do an analysis of who can r ecover 
the r eal mercantile property tax by raising prices. To observe the rela-
tionship between direct shifting and economic conditions, we can tabulate 
the answer s given to this question by the size of the town in which the 
business is located and whether the property has incr eased or dec r eased in 
value during the five years preceding the survey, r ecognizing that these 
variables are but proxies for real indicators of economic conditions. We 
can also tabulate answers by the r at io of sales to the tax increase. 
Mercantile personal property owners in professional activit i es-- law, 
medicine, accounting and the like- - indicate the greatest ability to shift 
the tax directly onto clients (see Figure 10). This might be due to the 
nature of the activity and the demand for it, or because the tax increase 
would be so small in dollars . A 20 per cent tax increase would mean an 
additional payment of less than $25 for more than 80 per cent of t hose 
characterized as professional (see Table 4) . A comparison of Table 4 with 
Figur e 10 shows that businesses are arranged in order by the magnitude of 
taxes as they are in order of ability to shift ta.'>:es directly fo r war d . 
Properties wi t h lower taxes indicate a greater ability to shift taxes fo r -
war d . Personal property taxes on wholesalers are quite high, possibly be-
cause of high valued merchandise or large inventories . Wholesalers also 
1 
See Appendix A. 
2 
See pp. 13- 14 above. 
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Tabl e 4 . Amount of a 20 per cent tax increase by t ype of business 
Amount of Type of business 
t ax inc r ease Pro fes - Ser vice Ret ail Whole- Ser ve 
sional s a l e food 
$ 0- $ 24 
Number a b 9,982 18,657 7,792 739 3, 292 
Per cent 81. 7 64 .0 35.0 22 . 2 44 . 8 
$ 25- $ 49 
Number 637 5,632 6 , 339 568 2,387 
Per c ent 5 . 2 19 . 3 28 .5 17.1 32 .5 
$ 50- $ 99 
Number 1 , 116 2 , 785 4 , 261 0 284 
Per cent 9 . 1 9 . 6 19 . 2 0 . 0 3 . 9 
$100 - $199 
Number 171 1, 885 2,820 0 842 
Per c ent 1.4 6 .5 4 . 7 0 .0 11 . 5 
Over $200 
Number 315 180 1, 023 2 , 024 543 
Per c ent 2 . 6 0 . 6 4 . 6 60 . 8 7 . 4 
Total a 
Number 12 , 221 29,139 22,235 3,331 7,348 
Per c ent 100 . 0 100 .0 100 .0 100 . 1 100 . l 
aTotals not adding to 100 .0 are due t o roundi ng . 
indicate a very low abi l ity to shift taxes directly forwar d . This could be 
due t o the l a r ge ar ea t o which they sell and the fact that t heir compet i tors, 
being fa r r emoved , would not be subject to the tax increase . Wholesaler s 
also pr obabl y pay a l a r ge absolute amount of property taxes bec ause of lar ge 
inventories . The size of t he market and the number and charac teristics o f 
compet itors probably affect the ability to directly shi f t the tax . 
Ability to shi ft the tax fonvard seems to decrease slightly as the 
50 
town size increases (see Figure 11). This might be expected if demand fo r 
the product or ser v ice of a particular supplier becomes more elastic as the 
town size increases. In a larger town the number of substitutes, alterna-
tives and competitors is larger than in a small town . If this causes de -
mand to become more elastic, it could be more difficult to shift the tax 
in a large town. Large metropolitan areas arc also more likely to have 
diffe r ent cax rates in districts access i ble to consumers . A businessman 's 
opportunity for recovering a t ax by raising prices is decreased if his com-
petitors are not subject to the tax . 
Unlike the answers about the shifting of rental property taxes, the 
pattern of answers about the shifting of business property taxes does not 
indicate a consistent or strong relationship between shifting ability and 
changes in the value of property (see Figure 12) . 
We would expect a business with a high ratio of sales to the amoun t of 
the tax increase to be able to recover the tax increase through raising 
prices more readily than a business with a lower ratio . Where the amount 
of the tax is very small r elative to sales, shifting the tax f orward would 
require only a small , perhaps unnoticeable price increase . On the other 
hand , where the tax is small relative to sales, it may be eas i e r fo r the 
business to absorb the tax with no noticeable decline after tax net revenue. 
Ther efore , businesses may not even cry to raise prices . The proportion of 
properties used in a business with a high sales to tax increase ratio able 
to recover the tax by raising prices is greater than that fo r properties 
with a lower sales to t ax increase ratio . This diffe r ence is not as great 
as we would expect were this ratio a major d~terminant of shifting ability . 
It should be noted, however , that where sales are more than 1000 times as 
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Table 5 . Direct shifting ability by the r atio of gross sales to t he amount 
o f a 20 per cent increase in taxes on mercantile r eal property 
Gross sal es / 
t ax increase 
Smaller than 
1000 
Number 
Per c ent 
Larger than 
1000 
Number 
Per cent 
All 
1, 446 
8.8 
1,023 
14.8 
Amount of tax increase r ecover able 
Some None 
2,184 
13.3 
1, 119 
16 . 2 
12' 722 
77 . 8 
4, 758 
69.0 
aTotals not adding to 100 .0 are due to rounding . 
Total 
16,357 
99.9 
6 , 900 
100.0 
large as the tax increase , it would be difficult to raise pric es by an 
amount which would exactly r ecover the tax. With a sales to tax incr ease 
ratio of 1000 , the price increase need be only 0 . 1 per cent or one cent on 
a one dollar item, or $1 on a $1000 item. Most merchants would consider 
this such an insignificant amount tha t they would not respond to t he tax 
increase . We should not, however, conclude that the merchant could not 
shift the tax or is not shifting a large portion of his total property 
taxes . He simply w-ou ld not bother to r espond to a tax increase which is 
trivial compar ed to his total costs and sales. I f the merchant did r espond 
by increas ing pr i ces, he would surel y r ecover sever al times the amount of 
the tax increase. He might lis t h i gher property taxes among r easons for a 
substantial price increase when in fac t t he tax increase per unit o f sales 
is less t han one per cent. Thus the tota l price increases for the 2142 
properties with Gross s ales > 1 who said they could shi ft the tax increase 
Tax increase 
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could well be an amount greater than the tax increase payable on the proper-
ty . 
Price changes will not affec t the r evenue productivity of a tax, but 
they will affect the incidence of the tax. A tax increase on about 25 per 
cent of mercantile r eal and personal properties in Iowa would be met with 
price increases in the related goods and services . Thus the burden of a 
sizeable portion of mercantile proper ty taxes will be passed on to con-
sumer s . 
55 
SUMMARY 
This study analyzes information collected in a survey of Iowa property 
owners. The answers o f respondents are used to e stimate the economic re-
spons es of property owners collectively to a property tax increase . Analy-
sis of the patterns trys to understand the possible i mpact of these collec-
tive r esponses on the goals of t ax policy . There are five main forms of 
r esponse : tax capitalization, investment decrease , cost reduction, tax 
transformation, and price increase. 
Tax Capitalization 
At least 40 per cent of all Iowa properties and 50 per cent o f income 
producing properties were owned by Iowans who felt a tax increase would de -
crease the value of their property. Thus less than 100 per cent of the tax 
increase on 40 to 50 per cent of Iowa properties can be shifted. Conversely 
50 to 60 per cent of Iowa property was owned by persons who fel t a tax in-
crease would not decrease property values. 
Effect of a Tax Increase on Investment 
Discouragement o f investment caused by a tax increase could spread the 
burden of the cax to labor, savers, r enters, and consumers . A 20 per cent 
increase in propert y t axes would cause owners of 60 to 70 per cent of real 
properties in Iowa to reduce or postpone investment in their properties. A 
r eduction in property r epair and construction would mean a smaller demand 
for loanable funds and the services of the construction industry . 'i'hese 
r esults could in turn reduce interest r ates to savers and reduce the hours 
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worked and incomes of laborers in the construction industry . Consumer s of 
housing services would face a decrease in the supply and quality of housing 
as a result of decreased investment . In a r eas where the demand fo r housing 
is growing , the l ack of investment would quickly create a shortage and per-
mit landlords to r aise rents and thus shift the tax onto tenants and buyer s . 
Once this occurs , the tax i nc r ease should no longer be a deterrent to in-
ves t ment. 
In many small towns , however, demand is not growing , and the tax in-
crease mi ght cause people t o leave and thus add to the loca l supply of 
housing . Any dec l ine in repair and upkeep would accelerate t he deteriora-
tion of t he local housing supply . The effect of a t ax increase is pr obably 
quickly responded to by r ent and price i ncr eases in a booming r ea l estate 
market while in a stagnant or deteriorating market, a t ax increase has long 
negative effects on incomes , i nvestment and housing quality. 
Only about 30 per c ent o f mercantile persona l proper ty owners in Iowa 
would r educe their investment because o f a 20 per cent increase in property 
taxes . Nercantile persona l property includes stor e inventories and ·working 
c apital items which directly affect the availability of goods to purchasers . 
Therefore , any cutback in investment would dir ect l y affect supply . Wher e 
demand is strong t his would quickly r esult in forward shi fting while in a 
small town with a weak demand , this cut i n supply mi ght mean loss of cus -
tomers to merchants in l arger towns causing further income loss and i nvest-
ment r eduction . A decline in i nvestment by only 30 per c ent of merchants 
and businessmen would probably r esult in a reduction of total supply suffi -
cient to permit other merchant s to raise pri ces or incr ease sales enough to 
cover the amount o f their tax increase . Thus shi ft ing may take place and 
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merchant s who do not personally perceive their ability to shift will be 
able to r ecover t he tax. 
Effect of a Tax Increase on Cost Reduction 
The ITS showed that taxes on very few properti es could be r ec overed by 
r educing costs. In mos t c ases less than 2 per cent of proper ties could re-
cover a tax increase in this way . Owners of 5 . 6 per cent o f mercantile real 
properties felt they could r ecover part of a tax increase by r educing costs . 
Since "costs" are a shorter- run variable than investment, we conclude that 
a property tax increase is expected to continue and thus has much greater 
effects on investments t han costs. 
Incentive Effect of a Tax Increase 
About 10 to 25 per cent of Iowa properties of all types were owned by 
persons who felt they could recover a property tax incr ease by increasing 
production and sales . Thus the tax increase would encourage the more effi-
cient use of resources. Agricultur al property owner s were predominant among 
owners who thought they could recover a property t ax increase in this way . 
This form of r esponse called tax transformation recovers the tax through 
intensifying the production process. The result is an increase in supply . 
Thus in its aggr egate effect, ta:x: transformation is approximately opposite 
to shifting which comes about through r educed investment and supply . 
Direct Shifting of Taxes onto Tenants 
There is considerable vari ation among property types in their ability 
to r ecover a property tax increase by raising rents. Owners of less than 
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10 per cent of agricultural r ental properties indicated that they could 
r aise the rent and shift the tax onto renters. The owner s of residential 
and mercantile rental properties reported they could r aise the rent and 
recover the r ent in 22.8 and 44 .5 per cent of the cases r espectively . 
Properties which had experienced an increase in value during t he five years 
preceding the survey r eported a distinctly gr eater likelihood of shifting 
the tax increase forward to tenants. 
Dir ect Shifting of the Tax Increase onto Consumer s 
When fac ed with a property tax increase, 2 to 25 per cent of Iowa 
property owners r eported they would raise the prices of the products or 
services they sell . A price rise prompted by a tax increase may cover more 
or less than the t ax increase . It might move the business closer or 
farther away f rom a profit maximizing price . There is much disequilibrium 
and uncertainty as to what is profit maximizing behavior. Shifting which 
takes plac e through immediate price increases is r arely treated in theoreti -
cal works on shifting because theory assumes that the entr epreneur is char g-
ing the pro fi t maximizing price which is unaffected by a change in f ixed 
costs. 
Economic theory would lead us to believe that agricultural property 
taxes cannot be shifted by r aising prices because farmer s are "price takers" 
not "price maker s ." Consistent with this we observed f rom the ITS that 
only about 2 per cent of agricultural properties had owners who thought 
they could recover any of a tax increase by r aising prices . This is low 
compared to 25 per cent of mercantile properties whose owners fe lt they 
could recover a t least part of the hypothetical tax increase by raising 
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prices . 
Nearly 30 per cent of mercantile personal property owners \.;ould try to 
r ecover the tax increase by raising prices. Types of businesses ranked from 
gr eat es t to least inclination to r aise prices and shift the tax on personal 
property forward ar e professional, service, serve food , retail and whole-
sale. 
The assurance t hat a property owner woul d r a ise price s and shi f t mer -
cantile real property taxes forwar d seems to increase with the ratio of 
sales to tax. That is, it is easi er to shi f t a tax increase of $1000 with 
sales of one million dollars than with sales of one-half mil lion dollar s . 
This r elationship is not perfect because the survey revealed many property 
owners who disagreed with the maj ority. 
The extent to which property t axes are actually shifted forward to 
consumers can be only roughly indicated on the basis of property owners ' 
opinions . These opinions r efl ect mar ginal behavior by speci f ic firms. The 
r eactions r eported are probably immediate and the effects of other s ' deci -
sions over longer periods a r e probably not considered . It is di fficult, 
actually, f or a property owner to have a clear picture o f his own long run 
shift ing ability . Nevertheless , it appears that property owners do have 
some ability for dir ec t shifting t hrough r aising prices and r ents inunedi -
ately. Perhaps 30 per cent or more of a property tax increase on mercantile 
property would be i nnnediately shifted onto consumers . About 40 per c ent o f 
a t ax increase levied on mercantile rental properties would be shifted onto 
t enants . These tenants would probably in turn shift it onto customers . 
Somewhat l ess, perhaps 25 per c ent of a tax increase on residential r ental 
properties can, in the opinion of the owners, be shif ted immediately onto 
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tenants by rent increases. Only about 10 per cent or less of a tax increase 
on agricultural properties which are rented out could be recovered , in the 
opinion of the owner, t h rough immediate rent increases. 
In addition to shifting \~1ich takes place through inunediate price in-
creases, there is shifting which comes about through the processes of de-
clining investment and reduction in supply . Since we have no information 
about just how much each property owner would reduce investment or how fast , 
i f eve~, the reduced investment would create a shortage suffic ient to raise 
prices, we cannot estimate how much or how soon shifting will r esult f rom a 
Sr:laller amount: of investm8nt. We do know that a large number, 60 to 70 
per cent, of property ovmers would be more r eluctant to make investment in 
t:hcir properties if taxes increased . It seems that in all growing demand 
areas this would quickly result in a sufficient shorta£e to raise prices 
enough to cover the tax increase. In the short run, f rom the shear number 
of property owners who say they would reduce investment , we can safel y con-
clude that a ta'\: increase would decrease the wor k and income of the con-
st-::uction industry . 
l·7!1ile shifting 0£ ta.-xes on income producing property definitely takes 
pL.ice, variation in answe!'s a!T'.ong O\·mers of different types of properties 
located in different places suggests that shifting takes place in varying 
amounts end at varying speeds . A property owner's ability to shift taxes is 
an individual characteristic determined by the type of property and local 
de:::and and supply conditions as well as his own personality, education and 
ability as a businessman . 
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SECTION IV 7 
Instructions 64 ~stions applicable 
Real estate of any type - - - - -White pages, Qiestions 1 through 5 
Mercantile personal property- -Green page, <.:µestion 6 
Agricultural personal property- - -Pink page, Qlestion 7 
Personal property - residential only - - - Skip all of Section IV 
(No real estate owned) 
PROPERTY VALUE 
(Interviever : If there are two or more lines for real estate filled out in Section 
III, they may need to be consoli dated because the respondent thinks of the parts as 
a unit . If there are two or more real properties, ask "Uestion l; if not go t o 
'"'uestion 2 . ) 
1. Are two or more of the properties in your opinion really sub-parts of the same 
unit? That is , are they the same class of property (mercantile, agricultural, 
residential) used for the same specific purpose (store, farm, private dwelling) 
etc . ) and generally considered a unit? (Interviewer: Enter one or more property 
numbers in Line a to make up the economic unit of Line b, making certain all 
? ... . 
3. 
4 . 
real properties are used . ) 
'!hat is each property unit? (Interviewer: TJrite a short title in Line c to 
indicate the purpose f or which the unit or property is used, e . g., farm, 
furniture store, family home, duplex, apartment house, vacant lot, factory, etc .) 
(Interviewer : Refer to the short title of Economic Unit 1 and complete Line c 
through k for Unit 1, and then repeat for Unit 2, and so on .) 
a. Property numbers (from Section III. col. 1) 
b. Economic unit number 1 2 ) 4 
c . Hhat is the unit? (l. farm, 2 . store, 3 . home, 
l~. vacant lot, 5. factory, 6 . other - describe 
in marp;in) 
d. How much would the unit bring if you sold it t oday? 
e. Hou much uould the defined area have sold for 
5 years ap;o (1960) as it uas then? 
f. Hha.t was the major cause of change in value 
during the last 5 yeaxs? (e.g.' 1. i mprovement 
a,dded, 2. improvement removed, 3. general 
change in l ocal property values, l~ . deprecia-
tion, 5. other - describe in margin) 
g . Is the unit rented out to someone else? 
(enter Yes or No) 
h. (If Yes in g) m1at is the yearly rental? 
(If No in g) About what would the yearly rental 
be if you were to rent it out? 
i . Is this unit useQ in the mmer' s m·m business? 
(e. g . used in his store, 
(Record Yes or No .) 
farm, office, etc.) 
j . (If Yes in i) Tlhat were the gross sales or 
receipts from this enterprise in 1964? 
k. 'lhat uas the total tax bill on this property 
( economic unit) in 1964? 
In llhich of the above economic units is your residence located? ----,------Economic unit No. 
or "none" 
Page 2 - Secti on IV 8 
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(Interviewer : If there are t uo o-.r mor e econ01D1c units of the same class (mercan-
tile, agricultural, residential) select one as instructed on random number table 
attached t o your cli pboard. (e . g . if the:.:·e are t l'TO stores n..ncl one house, select one 
of the stores and also use the house for the secti on belo'1 .) 
5. Over the past five years, :real est ate ta::~es in I oua have ::isen~ on the average , 
50 per cent. In ans,·rering the f ollowing questions, you will be helping us to 
understand the l!ays in which business and investment might be e.ffected i f this 
trend ' rere t o continue . Since we are interested in yow.· reaction only t o a 
tax change, it uill be necessary t o assume that all other business conditions 
remain just as they are no". 
Considering Unit numbe:.- ____ (Line b, ·µestion J) let us suppose that next year 
the tax on this property rose 20 per cent . That \·rould mean that instead of 
$ ( from line k , ")lest ion ) ) you would have to pay $ ______ _ 
(Interviewer: Ask questions a to g as appropriate . Then take the ne:>..'t unit and 
ask questions a tog, and so on.) 
Economic unit 
(a ) i lhat do you feel would happen t o the market value of 
this property as a result of this t ax increase? 
(1) Inc:..~ease : By what per cent? 
( 2) Decrease : By what per cent? 
(3) Remain unchanged 
(b ) How \'rould this tax increase affect your deci sions 
concerning investment in this pr oper ty?(check one) 
(l} Encourage investment 
( 2) Di scourage investment 
(_; ) Houl d not affect investment decisions 
Interviewer : Ask questions ( c) and \ d ) only about 
properties that are rented out (i. e . have Yes in 
line g of question j ) 
(c) How much, if any, of this t ax increase could 
you recover by i ncreasing the rent? (Per cent of 
tax increase or doll ars recover ed) 
(d) How much, if any, could you recover by cutting 
costs? (Per cent of ta;c increase or doll ars recovered) 
Inter viewer: Ask questions ( e ) through 1 g) only about 
propertie s that are not rent ed out but used by respondent 
in his o\m business (i .e. Yes in i of question .3 ) 
(e) How much, if any, of this tax increase could you 
recover by increasing the price of what you sell? 
(your services) ("/o or dollars) 
( f) How much coul d you recover by increasing volume 
of business without increasing wages? (3 or dollars) 
(g) How much, if any, of this t ax incr ease could you 
recover by reducing cost s other than labor costs? 
(% or dollars) 
Page J - Section IV 
0 
/ 
66 
(Interviewer: If Section III co11tains a. "mercantile personal property" entry, ask 
')lestion 6. ) 
6. a) T/hat kind of a "business" is this? 
(short title description) 
Over the past five years, property taxes in Ioua have risen, on the average, 
50 per cent. Property ta;:es on mercantile personal property change too. In 
answering the follouing questions, you will be helping us to und.e;.~sta.nd the 
ua:ys in which businessmen might be affected by changes in property te.;•es. 
Since we are interested in your reaction only to a tax change, it uill be 
necessary to assume that all other business conditions remain just as they 
are now. 
b) ' !hat were your taxes on merce.ntile personal property for 1964? $ ______ _ 
Let us suppose that next year the ta;{ on this mercantile personal property 
rose 20 per cent. That would mean instead of $ , you would have 
to pay $ -------
c) How uould this tax increase affect your decisions concerning investment in 
inventory and equipment? (by what per cent) 
l) : Tould increase inventory and equipment _ ____ pe:r cent 
2) l/ould decrease inventory or equipment per cent 
$) Hould not affect investment decision 
cl) How much, if any, of this tax increase could you recover by increasing the 
price of \That you sell, or your service? (Per cent of tax increase or 
dollars recovered) 
--------~ 
e) Hou much, if any, could you recover by increasing sales uithout r aising 
prices or costs? (Per cent of tax increase or dollars recovered) _______ _ 
f) How much, if any, of this tax increase could you recover by 
reducing costs? (Per cent or dollars) 
Pase 4 - Section IV 10 
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(Interviewer: If Section III contains an "agricultural person.l.l prope .. ·ty" entry, 
ask r;uesti on 7. ) 
7. a) :'hat were your taxes on livestock and machinery f or 1964? $ _______ _ 
Over the pest five yea:rs, property taxes in Iowa have risen, on the average, 
50 per cent. Property taxes on agricultural personal property change t oo 
In answering the foll owing questions, you will be helping us to understand. 
the ways in which farmers might be affected by changes in property ta;~es . 
Since ue are int erest ed i n your reaction only to a tax change, it uill be 
necessary to assume t hat prices and farm programs uould remain the same as 
they are nou. 
Let us suppose that next year your taJ: on livestock and machinery was 20 
per cent higher . That would mean that for the same livestock and machinery) 
instead of $ (from a) above), you would have to pay $ 
b) How would this affect your decisions about investing i n l i vestock and 
machinery? Uhat pe1· cent? 
1. I would increase livestock ;per cent 
2 . I would increase machiner y ;per cent 
J . I would decrease livestock investment per cent 
4. I would decrease machinery inventory ;per cent 
5. Would not affect investment decision 
c) Hou much, if any, of the tax increase could you recover by increasing 
production? (Per cent of tax increase or dollars recovered) 
d) Hou much, if eny, of this tax increase could you recover 
by reducing costs? (Per cent or dollars) 
e) If personal property tax were removed from cattle, 
uould you increase the number of cattle you have? 
f) If personal property tax were applied to hogs, would 
Yes No 
you decrease the number of hogs you raise? Yes No 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 6 . Properties with owners answering that the tax increase could be 
completely shi f t ed as well as capitalized 
Type of property 
Mercantile rental 
Mercantile used in owner's 
business 
Agricultural rental 
Agricultural used in 
owner ' s business 
Residential r ental 
Residential used in 
owner's business 
Number of Per cent of 
properties properties 
720 3.6 
1213 4 . 2 
1402 1.6 
0 0.0 
0 0.0 
0 0 . 0 
Economic theory requires a mutually exclusive relationship between tax 
shifting and tax capitalization. Using this proposition we can check the 
consistency of answers given in the ITS . Table 6 shows that a very small 
proportion of properties are represented by owners who felt that they could 
shift the entire tax burden onto consumers or tenants as well as that che 
tax would reduce the value of the property . This combination of answers 
conflicts with conventional theory. However, theory does not entertain t he 
possibility that the present ovmer can shift the tax , but that a prospec-
tive buyer might not be able to because of a change in the use of the 
property or the business practices of the new owner . 
The amount of discrepancy between actual answers and what theory would 
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predict seems insigni f icant. The uncertainty of answers has been noted 
previously and it i s r ecognized that this is not a perfect means fo r eval-
u ating the r eliability of answers. 
